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ABSTRACT 
Traditional analysis of events has used linear methods. This paper employs chaos theory to analyze cyber security events. It 
demonstrates that there might be an underlying pattern to seemingly random events. Determining this pattern can lead to a 
better understanding of what and when an event will occur.  
Keywords 
Cyber security, chaos theory, complexity theory, emergency management, managers 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, linear principles popularized by Newtonian physics and Cartesian mathematics have directed the field of 
management. In addition, scientific problem solving strategies have been largely based on reductionism. Systems were 
viewed as linear, regardless of their level of complexity. These approaches to analyzing a situation worked well for static 
environments exhibiting little change. However, the modern competitive environment is anything but static and linear. 
Today’s complex, non-linear systems can be studied using chaos and complexity theories, which focus on discovering order, 
structure, and patterns from chaotic behavior in complex systems. In this paper, we use Chaos Theory to shed some light on 
the potential of cyber disasters. 
Chaos Theory is the study of unstable non-periodic behavior in deterministic non-linear dynamic systems. A dynamic system 
is a system in which the elements affect each other reciprocally and with time lags. Complexity Theory studies how complex 
systems can generate simple outcomes. For example, a human being can be considered a complex system composed of 
billions of cells working together in such a way that the body functions as a single unit performing simple as well as complex 
actions. Intensity in the interactions among the units is a characteristic of complex systems. Some authors consider Chaos 
Theory as an extension of Systems Theory while others consider Chaos Theory as part of Complexity Theory. Chaos Theory 
focuses more on finding an underlying order in the apparent disordered behavior of deterministic dynamic systems, while 
Complexity Theory covers a wider perspective involving the conception of the system, its elements, its complex interactions, 
and possible variety of behavior types.  
Complexity Theory is comprised of four phases: stability, order, complexity and chaos(Battram, 1998). In the stability phase, 
inactivity reigns. In the order phase, predictable behavior exists. The complexity phase provides the greatest opportunity for 
affecting change. During this phase, systems may be nudged in certain directions, and chaos may potentially be averted. In 
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the final phase, chaotic behavior, there is no structure to support stability or order (Goulielmos, 2002). Cyber-disaster 
behaviors are chaotic states where management has difficulty dealing with the volume of requests for resources and existing 
policies and procedures do not support return to stability and order. 
A cyber-emergency is defined as an acute event in which a significant infrastructure failure or reduction in service involving 
multiple complex interrelated systems affects people negatively (Dunlevy, 2003).  Cyber-emergencies of such great 
disruption are typically reported to national level security agencies. 
The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency established the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination 
Center (CERT/CC) to assist organizations in improving security. The CERT/CC provides alerts, advisories, and summaries 
of critical incidents, along with fixes and workarounds to serious security problems. Unfortunately, the occurrence of serious 
incidents appears unpredictable and chaotic in distribution (CERT/CC, 2003). 
While cyber disasters have a low probability of occurring, when they do happen, they can have devastating consequences. 
This can be illustrated by looking at the financial services sector of the international economy. Wire transfer systems handle 
the majority of monetary exchanges using the Internet to accomplish these transactions. The sheer number of transfers is 
staggering. For example, in the U.S. the Fedwire Payment System moved $1.857 trillion dollars in 114.9 million transfers in 
2004 (FRB, 2003). Imagine the impact of losing this vital function for an extended period. Even a reduction in capability, as 
the consequence of an Internet attack, would affect a large number of people throughout the world. Therefore, it is important 
to understand how and when cyber disasters might occur over time before preparing to effectively respond to such crisis.   
If we accept that cyber disasters are erratic, unstable, and unpredictable then we assume that the systems are non-linear 
(Mainzer, 1994). Non-linear systems theory provides new insight into complex system behaviors previously thought to be 
chaotic (Priesmeyer and Cole, 1995).  The non-linearity of cyber-crises makes them difficult to foresee, adding to managerial 
complexity. 
Chaos theory delivers alternative frameworks for understanding interrelated elements in disastrous situations. These theories 
appear in a variety of areas including; disaster response management (Goulielmos and Giziakis, 2002; Koehler, 1995), 
strategic decision making (Richards, 1990), stock market behavior (Nawrocki, 1995).  How management responds during 
disaster events may critically modify outcomes. Traditionally, policies and procedures establish standards for action. 
However, emergency response often requires action beyond tradition. The idea of matching “unstable” strategies to resolve 
instability in the environment stems from Complexity Theory (Kiel, 1995). The value found in application of complexity 
theory may be the generation of alternate views of difficult situations. 
One of the characteristics of Chaos Theory is that small, seemingly unimportant changes or errors can alter the environment 
and lead to big changes or consequences. For example, a small amount of code in a web browser can lead to a significant 
exploitation of the network that can spread worldwide in a matter of days. All actions are interdependent within the system 
and therefore any action may affect the future of the system(Battram, 1998). Given the complex nature of cyber disasters, it 
can be assumed that their occurrence is not predictable using traditional methods.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine cyber-disasters to determine if Chaos Theory would aid in understanding the 
occurrence of crises, and to attempt simulation of such events. Cyber disaster data from the CERT will be analyzed using the 
following several methods.  
Two methods will be used for to diagnosis the data using Chaos Theory. The first method is called Rescaled Range (R/S) 
Analysis. This method is used to evaluate whether the time series data follows a totally random behavior, a persistent 
behavior or an anti-persistent behavior. These behaviors could be governed by underlying rules. The second chaos diagnostic 
method is called Lyapunov exponent. This method calculates a parameter that conveys information about the level of 
sensitivity of the system to initial conditions. Finally, a simple dynamic deterministic function will be used in an attempt to 
simulate the occurrence of cyber disasters over time. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data was collected from the online site of the ‘United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team’ (US-CERT, 2006). US-
CERT is a partnership established in 2003 between the Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors. 
The purpose of this partnership is to protect the nation's Internet infrastructure from cyber attacks. Due to the sensitivity of 
the cyber attack data, only vulnerability reports were accessible. Although this data might or might not represent the behavior 
of cyber attacks, it can be argued that vulnerability reports convey information about the types of cyber attacks along with 
recommendations to minimize the probability of attacks against such weaknesses. Vulnerabilities reported by CERT are the 
best indicator we have regarding the types of cyber attacks launched on the Internet. These vulnerability reports are the result 
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of carefully analyzing different cyber incidents reported daily by organizations and individuals in the US. The cyber incidents 
are classified and organized by vulnerability type and recommendations to protect against possible attacks are issued. 
Therefore, it is assumed that vulnerabilities are signals of the persistency of cyber incidents such as virus, worms, intrusions, 
and other types of cyber attacks. The data below covers vulnerability reports from January 1997 to January 2006. Table 1 
shows the frequency of reports by year. 
Year 
Number of 
Reports 
Published 
1997 7 
1998 10 
1999 30 
2000 90 
2001 327 
2002 304 
2003 225 
2004 345 
2005 261 
Total 1599 
Table 1. Vulnerability Reports by Year 
 
CERT information is updated daily, and the data can be collected by day of report. Reports for January 2006 were added to 
the 1599. A total of 1627 vulnerability reports were download and aggregated by month. Then a time series by month was 
used for the analysis. Figure 1 shows the number of reports by month. 
 
Figure 1. Number of Vulnerabilities Per Month (1997-1/2006) 
ANALYSIS 
In order to understand and shed some light on the behavior of cyber incident occurrences, first, a diagnosis of chaotic 
behavior was performed, followed by a simulation using a deterministic non-linear function. The chaos diagnostic tests 
determined if the frequency of the incidents follows a chaotic, random, or deterministic behavior over time. After testing for 
the level of chaotic behavior, a deterministic non-linear function was used in order to simulate the cyber incidents over time. 
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Chaos Diagnostic 
One of the objectives of this paper is to determine if the frequency of cyber incidents over time is random, follows a certain 
pattern, or follows a deterministic chaotic order. Even though there is no single direct measure or test for chaotic behavior, 
several tests provide information about time series data that include randomness, autocorrelation or dependence, and long 
memory. Two popular measures used frequently in several fields are the Hurst exponent (Hurst, 1951)or Rescaled Range 
(R/S) method (Mandelbrot and Taqqu, 1979), and the Lyapunov exponent (Oseledec, 1968). According to Lo (1991), the 
Rescaled Range analysis demonstrates superiority to more conventional methods of determining long-range dependence.  
Rescaled Range 
The Rescaled Range method was initially developed in the field of hydrology by Hurst (1951) and further extended in the 
field of fractal mathematics (Mandelbrot and Taqqu, 1979; Mandelbrot and Van Ness, 1968). Hurst discovered that a large 
number of natural phenomena such as river discharges, mud sediments, and tree rings are dynamic systems that follow a 
biased stochastic behavior over time (Sprott, 2003). Later Mandelbrot and Van Ness (1968) labeled this behavior as 
Fractional Brownian Motion (FBM) that is a generalization of the random walk. Any time series data may be seen as the 
graph of a Brownian motion over time. The Hurst exponent provides a measure of whether the time series is a pure random 
walk or has underlying trends with long memory such as a FBM. The method to estimate this exponent is called Rescaled 
Range analysis (R/S). 
Considering one-dimension motion, an object follows a random walk, also called Brownian motion, when the object 
randomly moves one-step at a time either going forward or backward depending on a random variable. An FBM is a biased 
stochastic behavior that follows certain trends or underlying order over time, while a random walk follows just a stochastic 
behavior without any specific systematic order. A random walk is said to have short memory since every step is independent 
of the previous step. It has short memory since the position of the object at time 1t +  depends on the previous position t , 
but the movement from time  to time  is totally independent. On the other hand, an FBM is considered either persistent 
(positive correlation) or anti-persistent (negative correlation) with long memory since no step is totally independent to the 
previous step. A system with FBM carries over some information from previous steps in order to determine the following 
step. An FBM can be persistent or anti-persistent. A persistent FBM is characterized by large periods with similar trend, 
while an anti-persistent FBM is characterized by very short periods with the same trend and more radical changes. In other 
words, the surface of an anti-persistent FBM time series will be rougher than that of a persistent FBM. A random walk will 
be something in the middle, not too jagged, but not too smooth.  
t 1t +
The value range of the Hurst exponent is  (Mandelbrot, 1975). The value of 0 H≤ ≤1 H  is a degree of persistency of the 
FBM. 
FBM with persistent behavior:  0 0H≤ < .5
Standard Brownian motion or random walk: 0.5H =  
FBM with anti-persistent behavior: 0.5 1H< ≤  
Using Monte Carlo simulations, the following behaviors were simulated to show the difference between these three types of 
behavior:  
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Persistent Fractal Brownian Motion (H=0.82)
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Figure 2. Persistent Fractal Brownian Motion 
 
In the persistent FBM seen in Figure 2, the behavior of the system at time  is not totally independent of behaviors before  
and the system is characterized by long periods with similar and consistent tendency –either decreasing or increasing 
t t
Standard Brownian Motion/Random Walk (H=0.50)
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Figure 3. Standard Brownian Motion/Random Walk 
 
In the standard Brownian motion or random walk in Figure 3, every step is independent of previous steps, so there is no 
correlation between the movements. In the antipersistent FBM, the movements of the system are negatively related to 
previous movements, so the system presents radical movements usually in opposite direction to the previous movement. 
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Antipersistent Fractal Brownian Motion (H=0.37)
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Figure 4. Anti-Persistent Fractal Brownian Motion 
 
Another way to understand the differences in these types of behavior is through the concept of fractal dimension of the 
curves. For a flat line, the dimension is one. The dimension of the curve increase as the curve departs from a line and become 
a jagged surface. For example, a curve with a dimension of a fraction close to 2 should be a very jagged curve that should 
resemble a coarse surface since the curve should move up and down in every period of time.  
The Hurst exponent is related to the fractal dimension of the time series curve by 2D H= − . A time series without changes 
over time (flat curve) has a dimension of 1 where ( 1H )= . As the curve moves toward a rough surface, H  will decrease 
and  will increase. A random walk has a dimension of 1.5 where ( 0D .5H )= . 
Method to Estimate the Hurst Exponent 
Rescaled range analysis (R/S) is used to estimate the Hurst exponent. This analysis is based on the asymptotic value of the 
maximum standardized distance that an object can move in a random walk or an FBM over a very large period of time 
(toward infinity). Feller (1951) proved that for a pure random walk the number of standard deviations that an object moves is 
almost equal to the square root of the time periods the object was randomly moving. For an FBM this relationship is similar, 
but the difference is that, instead of using an exponent of 0.5 (square root), the time period is raised to the H  value. This is 
shown by the following expression: 
( )/ ( ) , / HHR S t R S a t=∼  
Where: 
R  = Range of cumulative sums given by the difference between the maximum and minimum value of: 
0 1
( )jj i XiY Y X μ== + −∑  For 1 j t≤ ≤  
In other words, 1 2 1 2max( , ,... ) min( , ,... )t tY Y Y Y Y Y= − j and Y  is the actual Y  value of the time series curve at time j .  R
0Y  is the initial value of Y  at time . 0t =
iX  represents the stochastic movement at time or period . i
At time , the new value of  where 1i + 1i iY Y X+ = + i x1 ( )i i iY Y X μ+ = + − . 
( )S std X=  standard deviation of the stochastic movements or change from every time period. 
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t  = number of time periods 
a  = constant. 
Therefore, , that mathematically is equivalent to log ( / )nH R= S nln( / ) / ln( )H R S= . 
A better estimation of H  has been proposed by (Mandelbrot and Taqqu, 1979) using several combinations of subsets of the 
time series to calculate several /R S  ratios. A traditional way to create the subsets is to divide the initial set of time series 
data in two halves and then divide each half into two halves continuing until the sub-samples are no smaller than 4. Then for 
the step  there will be  parts or sub-samples of time series data. For each sub-sample in each step, an i 2i /R S  is computed 
and then all the /R S  for that step are averaged. There will be i  different averaged /R S s. To get the Hurst exponent the 
natural logarithm of the number of periods for each step is regressed on the averaged /R S s of the corresponding step. Then 
the Hurst exponent will be the coefficient of regressing ln  on ln( )it ( / )iR S . The regression model is a transformation of 
the original equation by applying a natural log to each part of the equation:  
We have different sets of /R S  for each iteration or step described above:  
/ Hi iR S at=  
Transforming the equation by logarithms: 
ln( / ) ln( )i iR S a H t ε= + +  
H  is the actual regression coefficient of this model.  
The specific steps to calculate the different / iR S  and the actual H  are detailed in (Corazza, Malliaris and Nardelli, 1997). 
This method was used in this paper.  
Estimation of the Hurst Exponent 
In our case, the sample size is 110 months. Using 31 sub-samples and following the method proposed by (Corazza et al., 
1997), the Hurst exponent was estimated at 0.3629. Table 2 shows some relevant estimates of this computation. 
 
Range of the whole sample 42 
Standard deviation of the monthly changes 8.3966 
Average of changes per month -0.00909 
Table 2. Estimates of Hurst Computation 
 
A correlation can be calculated by , so the autocorrelation is approximately -0.27. This estimate suggests anti-
persistence behavior of the vulnerability reports. This means that after an increase in the number of incidents in one month, it 
is more likely that the following month will decrease in a stochastic magnitude with a standard deviation of 8.39. This is a 
sign of a not totally chaotic behavior, however, it is not sufficient to provide a convincing conclusion. The Lyapunov 
exponent provides a more direct test for chaotic behavior. The following section will describe the method and results of this 
method. 
2C H= −1
Lyapunov Exponent Test 
Most experts in Chaos theory would agree that a system is chaotic if its behavior is aperiodic, bounded long-term, and 
deterministic exhibiting sensitive dependence to initial conditions (Sprott, 2003). The difficulty in providing evidence of 
chaotic behavior is to show sensitivity to initial conditions. The Lyapunov exponent provides evidence of a possible chaotic 
behavior and the level of predictability of the system. The Lyapunov exponent is a measure of the sensitive dependence of 
initial conditions and conveys the average rate of divergence or convergence of two neighboring trajectories in the time series 
data (Pigliucci, 2000). If the exponent is negative, the system converges to a certain point. If the exponent is close to zero the 
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system behaves with periodic regularity. If the exponent is positive, the system can be either chaotic with an underlying order 
or random. A large positive exponent is a sign of pure randomness, while a small positive exponent is a sign of chaos 
(Pigliucci, 2000).  
It is assumed that that the value for  can be calculated deterministically with a function of . The exponent can 
be calculated from experimental data or by a specific formula if the deterministic dynamical function is known. A Lyapunov 
local exponent has to be calculated for each  of the time series. This local exponent is the number to which the  
constant (2.71…) has to be raised to get the absolute value of the slope (derivative) of the time series function at the time 
period . The Lyapunov exponent is given by the average of all of these local exponents (Sprott, 2003). Symbolically, this 
can be represented as: 
( 1)Y t + ( )Y t
( )Y t e
t
1 0 0 0 0( ) ( ) * (Y f Y Y f Y Y f Y0 )′Δ = + Δ − = Δ  
Where  
0X  = Initial value of the random or stochastic part of the random walk with /f df dY′ = . 
The local Lyapunov exponent λ  is defined at 0X  such that 1 1 0( / )e Y Yλ = Δ Δ , or 1 1 0 0ln ( / ) ln ( )Y Y f Yλ ′= Δ Δ =   
The global Lyapunov exponent is computed over many operations: 
(1/ )* ln ( )iN fλ Y′= ∑  
iY  is the actual value of the time series curve at each point i . For the computation of the Lyapunov exponent, we are 
focusing on the derivative of the logistic map, which is the graph resulting from using ( 1)tY +  as dependent variable and  
as independent variable. It is possible to use the local Lyapunov exponents to identify possible attractors. For the present 
analysis, we only focused on the estimation and interpretation of the Lyapunov exponent. As we have mentioned, if the 
Lyapunov exponent is positive and small, then it is a sign of chaotic behavior. The value of the exponent conveys how 
chaotic the data is. This exponent also provides information about the rate of predictability of the time series since it gives 
information about how sensitive the time series is to initial conditions. The bigger the largest positive Lyapunov exponent is, 
the more rapid the loss of predictive “power” and the less the prediction time for the time series. 
( )tY
Estimation of the Lyapunov Exponent 
Simply stated, it is not possible to detect a deterministic dynamic function that relates ( 1)tY +  with . Using the method 
suggested by (Sprott, 2003), we computed the Lyapunov exponent. See Figure 5. Since we do not have a deterministic 
function of a deterministic function was defined according to the data. The data was sorted by the number of incidents 
. In those cases where there was no intermediate value between  and 
( )tY
( 1)tY +
( )iY ( )iY ( 1)iY + , a value was estimated using the previous 
and following data available. The value was computed as an extrapolation of these values according to the number of 
intermediate values to compute. By doing this, we have a specific value of ( 1)iY +  for each . Then, we could calculate the 
differences in  and  to compute the slope for each point , and average them to get the global Lyapunov 
exponent. After this procedure, we got a Lyapunov exponent of 1.2611. Since the exponent is small and positive, it is a sign 
of chaotic behavior, not totally random. This can suggest certain amount of underlying order in the chaotic behavior. This is 
consistent with the estimation of the 
( )iY
( )iY ( 1)iY + ( )iY
H  exponent since that result suggested some level of negative correlation in the data, or 
what is also named short memory. It is not possible to describe the structure behind the chaotic order, but it is possible to see 
that after an increasing trajectory, it is very likely that a decreasing value will appear, suggesting that a short term prediction 
would be possible.  
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Figure 5. Logistic Map 
 
Simulation 
Finally, we simulated the behavior of the data in order to see if we could find a deterministic behavior underlying the 
apparent semi-chaotic behavior. We used the simple dynamic deterministic function proposed by May (1976). The function 
is: 
( 1) ( ) ( )* *(1i iY A Y Y+ )i= −  
Where 
( 1)iY +  is the value of the time series curve at time ( 1)i +  
( )iY  is the value of the time series curve at time i 
A  is a constant with possible values [ ]0..4  
The possible values of any  are . ( )iY ( )0 1iY≤ ≤
This function can be used to simulate population of species in which the population in a period  depends on the 
population at t  and this population is regulated by limited natural resources (in this case, the term  is the regulator). 
This simple equation can generate equilibrium, cyclical order, or chaotic behavior. For certain values of the parameter 
1t +
( )1 iY−
A , the 
system can respond with any of these types of behavior. For example, if A  is between 0 and 3, the system becomes to 
equilibrium to a certain point depending on the initial value. From 3 to 3.5, no matter what initial value the system starts, the 
system ends up oscillating in two points. As the parameter A  increases from 3.5, the system behaves more chaotic until 4. 
After 4, the system diverges and goes to the minus infinite. This function has also been used to simulate dynamic economic 
models (Stutzer, 1980). 
After manipulating this function, modifying the initial condition and the constant A , the following time series emerged. The 
purpose was to find a behavior similar to that of our real data. Figure 6 shows this simulation of non-linear deterministic 
function of vulnerability reports by month. 
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Simulation of Vulnerability Reports
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Figure 5. Simulation of Non-Linear Deterministic Function 
 
The constant used was 3.95, while the initial condition was 1.233221 x 10 -21. It has been shown that this function shows 
chaotic behavior after a value of 3.58. It was not possible to get a similar time series compared with the real data. However, 
they are similar in the level of persistency of the time series and in the period where the number of reports increased. It is 
important to note that an apparent stability appeared at the end of the period. However, the actual behavior beyond this 
apparent stability is also chaotic. This is a sign that complex systems can apparently go to stability and suddenly move to the 
edge of chaos again.  
Conclusions and Discussion 
The present paper provides a new perspective based on Chaos theories to understand how the cyber incidents might behave 
over time. More specifically, the study questions and analyzes the underlying order of the apparent chaotic behavior based on 
the number of vulnerabilities reported to CERT. Understanding cyber incidents is an important issue since there has been an 
increase in the number of incidents worldwide. In addition, the negative impact of these incidents has grown dramatically 
since the mid 1990’s. The increase in frequency and type of cyber attacks for the last five years does not follow an apparent 
pattern (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn and Richardson, 2005).  
Vulnerabilities reported by CERT are currently the best indicator we can have regarding the types of cyber attacks launched 
on the Internet in the US every day. Even though the study does not pretend to predict the number of cyber attacks, it sheds 
light on the dynamics of cyber attack vulnerabilities occurring every month. Results suggest that the behavior of these reports 
is not purely random providing some evidence of short system memory. According to our results, the vulnerability time series 
data was anti-persistent and negatively correlated. The data present signs of non-totally random behavior. Some authors have 
argued that a chaotic system could be predicted only over very few periods of time that are multiples of the Lyapunov 
exponent. According to our estimation of this exponent, it could be possible to predict the number of vulnerabilities for a 
period of 20 days (1.2-1 number of months, which is less than one time period used in the analysis). According to the Hurst 
exponent estimation, the data is negatively correlated over time, meaning that after a decreasing number of vulnerability 
reports over some period of time, it is more likely that the following period there will be a radical increase in the number of 
vulnerability reports. This might suggest that in vulnerable complex IT systems –like most modern corporate IT 
infrastructures – managers should pay attention when the system is experiencing continuous decrease in number of incidents  
or periods of stability. In this situation, most managers might continue using their planned emergency response strategy 
instead of being aware and prepared for a very likely radical change in the system that could cause a crisis.  In crisis time, 
managers might be prepared to respond organically more than systematically. 
The main contribution of the present paper is the new approach to identifying underlying patterns in the frequency of 
incidents over time that could provide important information for predicting in the short-term. This methodology can be used 
in further research to analyze more detailed data of cyber attacks. Further research is needed to understand the dynamics of 
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cyber attacks by considering specific types of attacks and having access to data related cyber attacks reports. Variables such 
as severity of the attack, the propagation time, and the nature of the attack need to be considered in future work. 
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